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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS--RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF TO RECOVER DAMAGES
AT LAW AFTER DEFENDANT HAS BEEN COMPELLED BY INJUNCTION TO ALLOW A CONTRACT REPUDIATED BY EIM TO BE

CARRIED OUT.-P entered contract with D whereby P agreed
to furnish material and labor required in the grading and
paving of certain streets in the town at stipulated unit
prices for the completed work. D absolutely refused to
carry out its part of the contract. P secured an injunction
forcing D to perform in so far as performance did not impose
liability on D in excess of $54,000 and other available
f Unds. The. injunction was upheld in Atlantic Bitulithic
Company v. Town of Edgewood et al., 76 W. Va. 630, 87 S.
E. 183. P has been paid a total of some $60,000, but now
claims that by reason of the increased cost of labor and
material between the time he could have performed the
work under the contract, if it had been permitted to do so
by D, and the time that it was actually done after the injunction was awarded compelling D to accept performance
of the contract by P he was damaged in the sum of $55,000.
D's demurrer was overruled and D appealed. Held: Injured
party may keep repudiated contract alive and at end of time
specified sue thereon, or sue for profits which he would have
realized; party compelling acceptance of performance of repudiated contract may not recover under contract and in
addition damages for the breach. Atlantic Bitulithic Company v. Town of Edgewood, 137 S. E. 223 (W. Va. 1927.)
The court cited WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, §1334, to distinguish between a material breach which do-es not indicate
any intention to renounce or repudiate the contract and an
absolute repudiation. In the latter situation according to
Mr. Williston, "there can be no real election between continuation and 'cessation of performance * * * * * * and
the American law though giving the injured party in such
a case an election of remedies, has not only wisely denied
him in most cases the right to continue performance but has
refused to regard a continued willingness to receive per-
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formance as more than an indication that if the repudiator
will withdraw the repudiation, but not otherwise, the contract may proceed." The same section says that "where
there has been a material breach which does not indicate
any intention to renounce or repudiate the contract, the
injured party has a genuine election offered him of continuing performance or of ceasing to perform, and any action indicating an intention to continue will operate as a
conclusive choice; not indeed depriving him of a right of
action for the breach which has already taken place, but
depriving him of any excuse for ceasing performance on
his own part." Disregarding the possible effects of the
original decree limiting D's liability under the contract to
the amount of the bonds authorized "and other available
funds," reported in Atlantic Bitulithic Co. v. Town of Edgewood, supra, the principal case presents a novel problem.
To what type of case should Williston's rule as to repudiation apply? Can there -be such a thing as repudiation as
distinguished from a mere delay or material breach which
does not indicate any intention to renounce or repudiate the
contract, in the case of a contract capable of being enforced
in equity, and which has been in fact so enforced, after
there has been a so-called repudiation? In other words,
does not the decree compelling performance, for all practical purposes, have the effect of changing a repudiation
into a mere delay or material breach so as to bring the
case within that part of the rule relating to "breach"?
Certainly the wording of the latter part of the rule does
not seem to apply to a case like the present one. An examination of the authorities cited by Mr. Williston establishes the reason for its being. This is best illustrated by the famous case of Clark v. Marsiglia,1 Denio (N. Y.) 317, 43 Am.
Dec. 670. In that case the plaintiff was engaged by the
defendant to clean, repair, and otherwise renovate certain
pictures. After the plaintiff had commenced work the
defendant renounced the contract and ordered him to
cease work. The plaintiff, however, disregarded the order
and completed the job. He then sued for the contract
price. The court held that he could recover only for what
he had done before the order was countermanded plus
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.such further sums as would compensate him for interruption of the contract at that time and the profits he would
have made under the contract, because it was his duty to
mitigate the damages. The other cases are to the same
effect. None of these cases stand for the proposition that
if the plaintiff had secured a decree compelling the other
party to perform, that the plaintiff could not recover the
damages caused by defendant's delay in refusing to pdrform until compelled to do so by a court of equity. Perhaps one of the most common types of contract sought to
be enforced in a court of equity is a contract for the sale
of real estate. In almost all of these cases there has been
an absolute repudiation by the defendant in the suit. Yet
we find that in England, before the enactment of Lord
Cairn's Act, that courts of equity while granting specific
performance of the contract, refused in most cases to award
damages, and made the plaintiff sue at law for damages
caused by defendant's breach or repudiation. From this
state of facts it may be reasonably argued that it was the
common practice of the English law courts to award damages for such breach or repudiation, after specific enforcement. Still, in 1855, in the case of Prothero v. Phelpe, 7 De
G. M. and G. at page 734, before the passage of Lord
Cairn's Act, an English chancery court awarded damages
after a prior decree compelling performance by the defendant, and in addition thereto, damages for the original
breach plus damages for a breach after the original decree. See FRY ON SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 6th ed., ch. 3, as
standing for the proposition that equity may grant damages
after specific enforcement. But the tendency of the equity
courts at this time was not to grant such damages as a
matter of right, but generally to refer the injured party to
the law courts for compensation. Pomeroy in his work on
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE,

Vol. 1, §241, states that equity may

grant damages in addition to specific performance of the
contract. However, the injured party is sometimes referred to the law courts for compensation. The impression one gathers from this situation is that it is the common
practice, both in this country and in England, for law
courts to award damages after specific enforcement of the
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contract, without distinguishing between a breach and a
repudiation, providing the doctrine of merger does not
apply. It does not appear that the doctrine of merger would
apply in the principal case, PAGE ON CONTRACTS, §3562. The
same author, in section 3033, says "In some jurisdictions
a party to an executory contract (notably a building or
construction contract) who is not in default is permitted
to ignore the attempted breach of the part of the adversary party, and to continue performance even though such
performance increases damages." Continuing, Page says,
"In some cases relief is given at common law on this theory
(meaning that the contract by its terms fixes time for per'formance, and the law fixes this as the time for measuring
damages; and one of the parties to the contract cannot
modify the measure of damages by his own act) only in
cases where specific performance might have been had."
It would seem, therefore, that in such cases, where specific
performance has been had, that damages should'be awarded
in a separate action at law providing there had been no
merger of the right in the decree. The effect of the decree places the parties in the same situation as if the wrongdoer had merely delayed performance, in which case the
first part of the rule stated by Mr. Williston, and not tl~e
part applying to repudiation, should apply. In such a case
certainly the reason for the second part of the rule does
not apply, for the injured party is not violating the mitigation of damages rule more than if the defendant had
merely delayed performance, and the plaintiff had elected
to keep the contract alive and had sued for damages
caused by the delay. For a case holding that increased
price of labor and materials between the time set for performance by the contract, and the time when performance
actually occurred, because of defendant's delay, is a proper item of damages, see Bitting v. United State, 25 Ct. Cl.
502. So far as can be ascertained, the decision in the principle case is the only direct decision to the effect that a
party compelling acceptance of a repudiated contract may
not recover under the contract and in addition damages for
-H. R. W.
the breach.
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